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The judicial decision-making process is not one for whichresolution arises from counting, measuring, or weighing.Rather, the courtroom is a field for debate about the inter-
pretation and application of values as embodied in or reflected
by the law.  Decisions reached in court are judgments and not
mathematical conclusions in that the inherently contestable
nature of the issues at stake precludes an outcome that is self-
evident to all.  As such, although there is an element of fact-
finding that emerges in a judicial opinion, there is also always
a subjective valuation of the principles at stake; to draw on
Socrates, there is always an assessment “of what is just and
unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and bad.”  Most
often, the process of judicial decision making involves an
intermediate process in which fact-finding and subjective eval-
uative efforts intermingle and end up informing one another.
So the judicial decision is both explanatory and explorative,
revealing facts and drawing principled conclusions that tell a
story about what is just and why it is so.  In this way, the judi-
cial opinion straddles the worlds of science and fiction—con-
cerned as it is with uncovering facts, but always normatively
concerned with the story that emerges.  
These qualities make the judicial opinion, the product of
this ambivalent hermeneutic, an extremely complex literary
genre.   The difficulties arise not only from the disparate
processes of fact-finding and value judgment, but from the var-
ious functions that a judicial opinion serves once it has been
rendered.  There is the immediate conflict between or among
litigants that the courts must resolve.  It is necessary for the
court to arbitrate the discrete matter of concern to the parties
involved.  But the judicial text is also a synthesizer.  It filters
the body of existing law into a series of well-defined proposi-
tions that are then applied to the case at bar.  These proposi-
tions are then looked to and interrogated in subsequent cases.
As such, each judgment assumes a place within the jurispru-
dence and stands as precedent for future decisions.
Throughout each of these functions, the judicial opinion car-
ries out a symbolic role as well.  The judgment must stand as
an example of the proper functioning of the justice system and,
in so doing, reflect the health and vigour of the process.  A
given judgment must persuade a reader both that a fair resolu-
tion has been effected and that the decision is a correct appli-
cation of the rule of law.  Thus, the judicial opinion is not just
a reflection of an opinion and a representation of authority, but
also a device that must persuade while maintaining the legiti-
macy of the legal system.
An additional challenge emerges when the court decides that
there must be a change in the law.  To this list of disparate pur-
poses is added a further persuasive need—the judgment must
demonstrate why what was once good or true or just (or,
indeed, lawful) is no longer adequate.  It is at these turning
points in the law that the rhetorical nature of judgments
becomes most apparent.  While there is always an element of
persuasion and argument in the judicial opinion, it is at these
moments of change that the need for effective language is most
exigent.  I will argue that a critical component of the judge’s lin-
guistic toolbox is metaphor and that this device is most neces-
sary and effective at these turning points in the law.  A
metaphor has the ability to bridge the abstract and the concrete,
using elements of similarity to effect a seemingly natural appeal
to common sense, and to mold the future development of
jurisprudence.  This critical role for the metaphor in legal judg-
ments emerges from a consideration of the structure and func-
tions of a judicial opinion and the complementary functions of
metaphor. This relationship between the judicial decision and
metaphor is confirmed by an examination of key metaphors in
the development of Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence.
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Trial by Metaphor:
Rhetoric, Innovation, and the Juridical Text
Benjamin L. Berger
Socrates: Let’s look at it this way.  If we differed, you and I, about which of two things was more
numerous, would our difference on these questions make us angry and hostile towards one another?
Or would we resort to counting in such disputes and soon be rid of them?
Euthyphro: We certainly would.
Socrates: Again, if we differed about which was larger and smaller, we’d soon put an end to our dif-
ference by resorting to measurement, wouldn’t we?
Euthyphro: That’s right.
Socrates: And we would decide a dispute about which was heavier and lighter, presumably, by resort-
ing to weighing. 
Euthyphro: Of course.
Socrates: Then what sorts of questions would make us angry and hostile towards one another, if we
differed about them and were unable to reach a decision?  Perhaps you can’t say offhand.  But con-
sider my suggestion, that they are questions of what is just and unjust, honourable and dishon-
ourable, good and bad… 
Plato’s Euthyphro, 7b-d.
Footnotes 
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2. C. PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL AND
LEGAL REASONING 150 (D. Reidel Publishing Company 1980).
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4. Supra note 1, at 685.
THE JUDICIAL OPINION
The Canadian judicial opinion assumes an organized form
and structure.  This particular form becomes a kind of tem-
plate for decisions to which legal professionals become accus-
tomed.  Although there can be variance among the precise
structures adopted by a particular judge, there is nevertheless
a common form that can be discerned.  This form is the means
by which the content of legal decisions is communicated to
and, subsequently, understood by the community, broadly
defined.  As such, this structure is not just an organizational
form, but is the locus for community debate on the topic at
hand as well as the paradigm of legal reasoning that configures
the ensuing conversation.  The conventional form of the deci-
sion constitutes a structuring of legal knowledge and thought
in a communicative social document and, as such, can be
understood as the foundation for a legal rhetoric.  J. B. White
recognizes that this rhetorical character has implications for
the social and cultural functions of law:
...[T]he fact that the law can be understood as a
comprehensibly organized method of argument, or
what I call a rhetoric, means that it is at once a social
activity—a way of acting with others—and a cul-
tural activity—a way of acting with a certain set of
materials found in the culture.  It is always commu-
nal, both in the sense that it always takes place in a
social context and in the sense that it is always con-
stitutive of the community by which it works.1
Canadian judgments generally begin with a statement of the
facts of the case.  The conflict, crime, or dispute is described in
a sort of narrative that is ultimately aimed at delineating the
main issue at trial or on appeal.  A distilled statement of the
critical legal point in question generally follows this narrative.
This final section sets the scene for the legal argumentation
that will follow.
The next portion of the judgment characteristically consists
of the history of the case.  An appellate court will recount the
arguments and reasoning offered in the lower courts and
describe the manner in which the law and facts were inter-
preted at these stages.  Next, the court sets out what it sees to
be the relevant law used to decide the issue under considera-
tion.  This description will likely include a presentation of rel-
evant statute law and a survey of the case law, both of which
will inform the reasoning of the court.  Essentially, this process
is the assemblage of all sources of authority that the judge or
judges will have to consider while coming to a decision.  Often,
the judgment will include excerpts from past decisions and will
extract what the court understands to be the critical principles
that will affect the judges’ determination in the case.  At this
point, the judicial opinion has laid out the facts, the history of
the case, and the critical law.  The essential component of the
decision follows, in which the court turns its attention to the
application of the law to the facts.
Here the judgment crystallizes
and the court draws its final con-
clusions as to the appropriate dis-
position of the case in light of the
applicable principles of law.
This structure, briefly out-
lined, demonstrates that the judi-
cial opinion involves a series of
tasks.  A judgment must success-
fully delineate facts, canvass
legal history, assemble and assess
the applicable law, and arrive at
an appropriate conclusion.  From this constellation of tasks,
one can discern a number of purposes for the judgment.
Importantly, it is not the purpose of the judicial opinion to act
as a means of reaching a decision.  Rather, once the opinion is
written, “the judge’s intellectual effort has already been
achieved, his deliberation finished, and there remains only the
question of form.”2 Indeed, C. Perelman argues that “the
important thing is not the passage from premises to conclusion
but the way the judge justifies his premises both in fact and
law.”3 This process of justification is achieved by accomplish-
ing three objectives.  First, the judgment must maintain the
authority and integrity of the legal process.  Second, the opin-
ion must attract authority for the discrete point of law that the
court has decided.  Finally, and particularly in cases where the
court departs from established law, the decision must persuade
the reader that justice has been carried out. 
The authority of the judicial system substantially depends
upon the appearance that it has conformed to the rule of law.
The rule of law demands, among other things, that decisions
are reached through a reasonable and transparent process.  The
law must not appear capricious or arbitrary in the deployment
of its power.  As well, the courts must apply the duly consti-
tuted laws of the country as enacted by the democratic legisla-
ture.  “The older (primarily Judaic and Christian) tradition saw
the law as a set of authoritative commands, entitled to respect
partly from their antiquity, partly from their concordance with
the law of nature and of God.”4 To the extent that these
sources are no longer regarded as the fount of authority in a
modern liberal state, the judicial opinion must garner its legit-
imacy from the reasoned manner of its application.  By con-
forming to the due process of law, including both transparent
and equitable reasoning as well as the application of the legit-
imate laws of the nation, the judicial opinion asserts the legit-
imacy of the processes of justice and, in so doing, argues for its
own authority.
The judgment also asserts the legitimacy of the law to which
it appeals.  The courts operate on the principle of stare decisis,
which dictates that previous decisions made on a similar topic
ought to be binding on subsequent courts.  This doctrine, also
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known as the doctrine of
“precedent,” ensures a
degree of predictability and
transparency to the applica-
tion of law.  The past history
of the common law affects
the manner in which pre-
sent issues of law should be
decided; indeed, the use of
precedent “is the invocation
of the authority of prior
texts to shape and constrain what should be done in the pre-
sent.”5 This principle provides the law with a legitimacy
derived from the history and collective experience of the law.
James Boyd White imagines what a system without judicial
opinion would be like:
One’s first reaction might be to think that in such
a system there would be no precedent, no argument
from precedent, and in this sense no law: every
question would be argued as an original matter,
without the advantage of the collective experience
over time that the judicial opinion provides.  We
would be deprived of a crucial method of learning
from the past, indeed, of a way of making ourselves
over time.6
When a judicial opinion appeals to past law, it at once jus-
tifies the interpretation that the court is about to adopt and
affirms the weight and significance of the principle of stare
decisis.  It is for this reason that some have commented that “a
judicial system relying on precedents requires by its very
nature citation from prior opinions. . . .”7 Through the use of
precedent the writer is able to claim authority for the law itself.
In addition, the affirmation of stare decisis in a judgment
ensures that it, too, may be relied upon in the future for its
own precedential value. The effect of precedent is to affirm
past law, legitimize present rulings, and to mold the future
development of the law.  As such, each decision has a circular
authoritative effect or “self-legitimizing” nature in addition to
a prospective impact.
Both of these functions (ascribing authority to the justice
system and to the law itself) rely on an element of persuasion
in judicial opinions.  Judges face a number of persuasive tasks.
They must convince the reader that the system has operated
properly, that the law is itself legitimate, and that the court has
arrived at a just resolution as between the litigants.  This per-
suasion requires the judge to use language in a rather literary
fashion: “without persuasion, law could not be law, and with-
out fiction, there would be no persuasion.”8 The judge is effec-
tively constructing a “story” of the case—a story that will be
more or less convincing, commensurate with the consistency
and coherence of its internal structure and arguments.  Again,
the social nature of the judicial opinion emerges from an appre-
ciation of its persuasive elements.  A judgment is written with
an audience, or audiences, in mind and it is the child of the
legal system, which is itself a cultural institution.  So while a
judicial decision is always invested with certain inertia toward
clarity, the argumentative nature of the text invests it with an
element of uncertainty—will the argument be successful, will
the reader be persuaded?  As P. Goodrich observes,
While the law is undoubtedly invested with a
peculiarly “concrete” force or function, its argumen-
tative method and justificatory rhetoric encode a
relation to the social in a manner that can never be
either verified or falsified.9
But an additional persuasive burden is imposed when the
court decides that the law should change or be reconceptual-
ized.  Suddenly, the court must justify its departure from the
weight of precedent but must not, in the process, throw into
question the legitimacy of law or the justice system.  To meet
this task, all tools in the judge’s linguistic toolbox must be
employed.  The balance of this paper will argue that recourse
to metaphor is an essential technique used in judicial opinion
to discharge the judge’s persuasive burden and that metaphor
is particularly used where the court sets out to alter the law.
THE METAPHOR
The metaphor has attracted the concerted and sus-
tained attention of philosophers, philologists, linguists,
rhetoriticians, and semioticians for much of written history.
This seemingly simple linguistic trope has proven to be a
touchstone for intense debate regarding the nature of language
and of thought.  With Nietzsche, the metaphor became a mod-
ern philosophical problem of language that has carried forth
into 20th century.  The structuralists, represented by Jakobson,
Saussure, and Barthes, forwarded a theory of metaphor that
focused on the semiotics of language and thought.  The mass
of literature that has accreted around the concept of metaphor
is complex and intriguing.  However, for the purposes of this
analysis, the starting point for understanding the basic func-
tioning of metaphor is Aristotle:
Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that
belongs to something else; the transference being
either from genus to species, or from species to
genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of
analogy.10
At core, the metaphor is a linguistic means of drawing
together two objects, items, or concepts.  The metaphor “des-
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ignates a verbal/symbolic
relationship (usually based
upon similarity) between two
concepts or images which
mutually describe or enhance
each other.”11 This concep-
tual relationship consists of
describing one thing with ref-
erence to another, thereby
linking particular features of
the two.  As such, metaphor
is “both a peculiar or aberrant
form of naming things and is
also a potentially logical act of predication attributing a resem-
blance. . . .”12
But this tension between peculiarity and logic is precisely
what affords the metaphor its rhetorical force.  The semblance
of absurd equivalence is followed by a realization of similarity
and this conceptual progression effects a number of purposes,
particularly when the metaphor is used to communicate or
interpret an abstract idea.  First, when a metaphor is used to
describe a concept in terms of a familiar object, the realm of
the abstract and the concrete are bridged.  Second, to the
extent that the metaphor refers to the qualities of this everyday
object, this trope makes an appeal to “common sense.”  Finally,
once established, the ultimate logic of the equivalence drawn
can have the effect of shaping the manner in which the abstract
concept is ultimately understood.  These selected functions of
metaphor have particular resonance in legal discourse.  Each
serves a function in communicating legal reasoning and gain-
ing authority for judicial decisions.  
The metaphor is particularly apt as a means of explaining
complex or abstract ideas.  By drawing the idea together with
a familiar item or phenomenon, the metaphor provides a con-
ceptual bridge for the reader to follow:
The metaphor provides the “abstract,” imageless
thought with an intuition drawn from the world of
appearances whose function is ‘to establish the real-
ity of our concepts’ and thus undo, as it were, the
withdrawal from the world of appearances that is
the precondition of mental activities.13
The metaphor is the vehicle that carries the reader from a
world of common objects, and their attendant qualities, to the
realm of ideas.  By effecting this link, the metaphor acts to
“guarantee the unity of human experience”14 in that even the
most conceptual and theoretical ideas find explication through
analogy to common phenomena.  The metaphor is the agent by
which a reader is invited to understand a complex idea by
assigning to it qualities found in a familiar or simple object.
Legal thought often operates in the realm of the abstract and
complex.  Indeed, law has its own language of specialized and
artificial terms assigned meanings particular to the legal world.
These terms are functional and instructive in the legal realm
and for the purposes of analysis, but when the courts must pre-
sent their findings to the public, these abstract constructions
will not suffice.  Perelman recognizes this use of metaphor aris-
ing from the need for communication:
From artificial languages are excluded vagueness,
imprecisions and analogic and metaphoric uses of
notions. . . .As soon as the strict rules imposed arti-
ficially by language yield to the hermeneutic
requirement, the same words will no longer have the
same meaning; a significance given in one context
can no longer be valid in all others; the use of anal-
ogy and metaphor can no longer be denied, but, on
the contrary, imposed by the desire for communica-
tion and comprehension.15
Thus, while for the purpose of analysis the courts can refer
to the constitutional division of power by use of special terms
such as “interjurisdictional immunity,” “paramountcy,” and
“double aspect fields,” they consistently resort to the term
“watertight compartments” to convey the strict segregation of
provincial and federal powers.  The metaphor carries with it an
explicative power that inheres in its ability to bridge the con-
crete and conceptual worlds.  As such, the metaphor acts as
more than a mere linguistic flourish or stylistic embellishment
—it is a mode of thought that concretizes and, in so doing,
communicates abstract or peculiar concepts.  Thus, “through
incorporation of tropes into legal opinions, what is abstruse
and obscure becomes concrete and comprehensible.”16
Attendant upon this communicative clarity is the ability of
the metaphor to make an appeal to common sense.  Through
the equation of the abstract with the everyday, what is alien
and novel is rendered familiar and, in some sense, obvious.  H.
Arendt reflects that
The simple fact that our mind is able to fund such
analogies, that the world of appearances reminds us
of things non-apparent, may be seen as a kind of
“proof” that mind and body, thinking and sense
experience, the invisible and the visible, belong
together, are “made” for each other, as it were.17
Once the reader accepts the equivalence or “link” between
the abstract concept and the everyday, the implications of these
common qualities become apparent.  A set of “obvious” infer-
ences flows from the familiar characteristics highlighted by the
metaphor. For example, the notion that love is precious or
must be treated with care is self-evident—common sense—
once it is accepted that “love is like a rose.”  As Lakoff and
Johnson note: 
Because so many of the concepts that are impor-
tant to us are either abstract or not clearly delin-
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eated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time,
etc.), we need to get a grasp on them by means of
other concepts that we understand in clearer terms
(spatial orientations, objects, etc.).18
This appeal to common sense is of critical importance to the
juridical metaphor.  If the court is arguing that a particular idea
must be interpreted in some fashion and can draw a metaphor-
ical link to an analogous situation in common experience, arti-
ficial judicial reasoning can appear to be simple common sense.
Returning to the division of powers example, a court arguing
that legislative powers must be tightly constrained within par-
ticular bounds makes an apt analogy to the “watertight com-
partment.”  If legislative powers are “watertight compartments,”
then it is common sense, or obvious, that there should be no
overflow between powers.  Thus, legal discourse can use the
metaphor to afford the legitimacy of common sense to its own
reasoning.  This use of the metaphor is apropos, given that cases
arise from common experience and the principles arising from
judicial opinion must, ultimately, be used in common experi-
ence: “since the story both begins and ends in ordinary language
and experience, the heart of the law is the process of translation
by which it must work, from ordinary language to legal lan-
guage and back again.”19
Finally, the metaphor functions to shape subsequent thought
about the concept that it modifies.  Any metaphor emphasizes
certain qualities while hiding others, thereby focusing subse-
quent attention on only those common features upon which it
depends.  This is particularly true where a “fresh” metaphor is
introduced because this newly revealed relationship is immedi-
ately defined in terms of the qualities that its creator has
stressed.
New metaphors, like conventional metaphors,
can have the power to define reality.  They do this
through a coherent network of entailments that
highlight some features of reality and hide others.
The acceptance of the metaphor, which forces us to
focus only on those aspects of our experience that it
highlights, leads us to view the entailments of the
metaphor as being true.  Such “truths” may be true,
of course, only relative to the reality defined by the
metaphor.20
Once the relationship is accepted, future discussion about the
abstract element of the metaphor is shaped, limited, and con-
strained by the conceptual definition that the trope has created.
Consider the spatial metaphors associated with the concept of
“control.”  Control is associated with the spatial concept “up” as
in “I have control over him.”  Once this association is accepted,
the tendency is for this formative relationship to guide future
conceptualizations of control: “he is under my power,” “I’m on
top of the situation,” “I have
it under control,” etc.  This
pattern does not preclude
other constructions of the
concept, but the metaphori-
cal association between
“control” and “up” is a very
powerful one.
The same dynamic takes
place when metaphors are
used in legal opinions.
Once a legal concept is
imbued with the “spark of imagination”21 of metaphor, this lin-
guistic relationship exerts a substantial coercive and constrain-
ing effect on future thought about the law.  Certain aspects of
legal problems are drawn out by metaphors and subsequent
thought focuses upon these highlighted characteristics.  As
such, the use of metaphor in judicial decision making is a
means for the court to extend its approach to a legal principle
or concept beyond the particular case by fixing upon particular
dimensions or qualities of the law in question.  These
metaphorically centralized qualities become the lens through
which the problem is seen in the future while other dimensions
of the problem not captured by the metaphor fade into the
rhetorical background.  This constraining effect is heightened
by virtue of the principle of stare decisis (itself a metaphor—to
“stand” by a decision), discussed earlier.  The doctrine of prece-
dent and the very language employed by the judge combine to
create metaphorical limits upon judicial reasoning.
Ultimately, each of these uses of metaphor in judicial opin-
ions contributes to the overall project of a set of judicial rea-
sons—to persuade.  For the law to retain its legitimacy, its audi-
ences must be convinced that legal institutions are arriving at
just and appropriate conclusions.  Robert Gordon comments as
follows:
. . .[T]he power exerted by a legal regime consists
less in the force that it can bring to bear against vio-
lators of its rules than in its capacity to persuade
people that the world described in its images and
categories is the only attainable world in which a
sane person would want to live.22
This need to persuade is heightened where the courts
attempt to make a substantial change in the law.  In these cases,
the judicial opinion must convince the reader that the just res-
olution to a case requires a departure from the weight of his-
torical interpretation as well as a reformation of the way in
which the law ought to deal with a given issue.  To the extent
that it is able to render the complex simple, appeal to common
sense, and structure thinking about a particular issue, the
metaphor can be seen as a powerful tool to be used in this task
18. G. LAKOFF, et al., METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 115 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1980).
19. Supra note 1, at 692.
20. Supra note 18, at 157-8.
21. P. RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF
THE CREATION OF MEANING IN LANGUAGE 303 (Robert Czerny trans.
Univ. of Toronto Press 2001).
22. R. W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109
(1984).
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of persuasion.  The final
section of this paper will
offer three examples of
instances in Anglo-
Canadian jurisprudence in
which metaphor was used
in the manner outlined
above to justify a funda-
mental change in the law.
THE LIVING TREE AND
THE GOLDEN THREAD
A n g l o - C a n a d i a n
jurisprudence is replete
with metaphorical con-
structions of the law: estop-
pel is a “shield, not a sword;” judges fear that their decisions
will have a “chilling effect” on commerce or will open the
“floodgates” to litigation; some arguments are mere “side-
winds” while others are “foundations” of the law; and for the
purposes of freedom of speech analyses, society is a “market-
place of ideas.”  As argued above, these figurative devices are
not merely ornamental additions to judicial opinions but,
rather, are rhetorical tools used to preserve and enhance the
legitimacy of the law through their persuasive power.  Two
examples will focus this argument on particular instances in
the history of Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence when the
metaphor was used to argue for a significant change in the law.
First, in the Edwards23 case, which established that the legal
term “persons” includes women, the Canadian Constitution
was called a “living tree.”  Secondly, the presumption of inno-
cence was called the “golden thread” of the criminal law when,
in R. v. Woolmington,24 the court asserted that the Crown must
prove the guilt of an alleged murderer beyond a reasonable
doubt.  
Also called the “Persons Case,” Edwards, an appeal to the
English Privy Council from the Supreme Court of Canada, was
a landmark case for first-wave feminism.  The appellants
argued that s. 24 of the British North America Act, 1867,
Canada’s constitution at the time, should be interpreted so as to
allow women to hold office as a senator.  The Supreme Court
of Canada had earlier concluded that the drafters of s. 24 did
not intend to include women as “persons” eligible to serve as
senators.  As such, the Supreme Court felt constrained to inter-
pret this section in an exclusionary manner.  The English Privy
Council agreed that this was likely the intent of the drafters.
However, the English court also remarked that “customs are apt
to develop into traditions which are stronger than law and
remain unchallenged long after the reason for them has disap-
peared.”25 On this basis, the Law Lords argued that the
Canadian law should adapt to changing social values and that
women should be eligible to act as senators.  In coming to this
conclusion, the court famously declared the following:  “The
British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capa-
ble of growth and expansion within its natural limits.”26
This decision was controversial and bold.  Yet by using this
metaphor of the Constitution as a “living tree,” the court
achieved a number of important persuasive effects.  First, it
reduced a complex and abstract discussion about the rules of
statutory interpretation to a simple, common symbol—everyone
can conceive of a tree and the natural properties that it possesses.
Secondly, the court appealed to common sense—if, indeed, the
Constitution is a living tree, it naturally follows that it must
grow and change.  Finally, the court shaped future thought about
the way in which the Canadian Constitution should be inter-
preted.  As a document whose very nature involves growth and
transformation, this metaphor suggests that judicial interpreta-
tion of the Constitution should allow for change. 
Although, once accepted, there are a series of common-sense
propositions that follow from this metaphor, note that there is
nothing self-evident about the association itself.  Indeed, the
Privy Council could just as easily have argued that the BNA Act
is a non-animate rock, set down in writing and not to be
reshaped, only to be discarded and replaced.  But by seizing
upon certain characteristics of the written document—namely,
its adaptability and capacity for change—the Privy Council
affected the future development of Canadian constitutional
jurisprudence.  Since 1930, Canadian courts have consistently
returned to this metaphor when describing the Constitution and
arguing that it should adapt to changing social circumstance.
Decided in 1935, Woolmington remains a starting point for
the analysis of Anglo-Canadian criminal law.  It is read in first-
year criminal law courses to teach students the fundamental
concept that an accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Yet, when decided, there was
nothing self-evident about this assertion of principle.  Rather,
many held fast to the notion that once the Crown proved that
the deceased died at the hands of the accused, it was the
accused’s responsibility to rebut the presumption that he pos-
sessed the intent to kill.  At trial, the judge in Woolmington
charged the jury in the following way: 
In every charge of murder, the fact of killing
being first proved, all the circumstances of accident,
necessity, or infirmity are to be satisfactorily proved
by the prisoner, unless they arise out of the evidence
produced against him: for the law will presume the
fact to have been founded in malice until the con-
trary appeareth.27
But, having surveyed the English criminal law, the House of
Lords reversed the decision of the trial judge and asserted a new
fundamental principle:
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law
one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty
of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt. . . .  If,
at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a
reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by
either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether
23. Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from Canada).
24. Woolmington v. D.P.P., [1935] A.C. 462 (H.L.).
25. Edwards, A.C. 124 (P.C.) at 134.
26. Id. at 136.
27. Woolmington, A.C. 462 (H.L.), at 472.
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the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious
intention, the prosecution has not made out the case
and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.28
The impact of this declaration cannot be overestimated.
Modern Canadian jurisprudence has remained faithful to this
notion and the presumption of innocence is now considered a
hallmark of trial fairness.
How does one account for the ascendancy of this principle
articulated in Woolmington?  Surely the consonance of the pre-
sumption of innocence with certain principles of natural justice
is somewhat explanatory.  But another aspect of the enthusiastic
adoption of this concept is the persuasiveness with which its
importance was argued.  The court’s choice of metaphor played
no small role in this rhetorical victory.  Once again, this case
demonstrates that the metaphor can bridge the gap between the
abstract and the concrete.  Lord Sankey, the author of this judg-
ment, was able to explain the complex interconnectedness of
principles in the criminal law as well as the central importance
of the presumption of innocence in this system by using the sim-
ple metaphor of a single golden thread within a web.  In this
construction, the “golden thread” is the most valuable element
in the web.  It will not tarnish.  If severed or removed, the beauty
and value, if not the integrity, of the web as a whole would be
diminished.  
Once accepted, this metaphor
leads to the natural, or common-
sense, conclusion that this singu-
lar thread must be protected and
valued above all other tenets of
criminal law.  But additionally,
the invocation of a beautiful and
treasured metal appeals to an
aesthetic and emotional sense in
the reader.  The combined
impact of the metaphor is to
counsel for the careful treatment
of this precious principle.
Indeed, this was precisely the
effect of the judgment.  Future jurisprudence incorporated and
repeated this trope such that, even in modern Canadian crim-
inal jurisprudence, no principle is so fundamental and cher-
ished as the notion that the Crown must prove a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Though both serve similar explicative and rhetorical func-
tions, these two example metaphors do so, in at least one
respect, in very different ways.  The “living tree” metaphor
includes a generative aspect.  That is, the metaphor itself
invokes and invites future thought about the implications of the
image upon the interpretation of that which it embodies.  While
28. Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
“Once again,
this case
demonstrates
that the
metaphor can
bridge the gap
between the
abstract and the
concrete.”
Fall 2002 - Court Review 37
38 Court Review - Fall 2002
bounded by the limits of the metaphor, debate can continue as
to what precisely it means to say that the Constitution is a “liv-
ing tree.”  In contrast, the metaphor of the “golden thread”
effectively ends the creative-interpretive discussion.   More than
providing boundaries and guiding thought, this image fixes a
single approach to the concept that it explains and concretizes.
This distinction demonstrates that it is not sufficient to recog-
nize simply that legal metaphors shape thought.  The choice of
metaphor—in this case, the choice between one that is genera-
tive and one that is constrictive—can profoundly affect the
manner in which legal thought is affected.
METAPHORS IN JUDICIAL OPINION—CONCLUDING
REMARKS
This article has focused upon the explanatory and persua-
sive powers of the metaphor when used in judicial decision
making.  It is important to recognize, however, that alongside
its positive rhetorical uses, the juridical metaphor also has the
potential to mislead, distort, obscure, and distract.  The
process of simplification can remove complexities that ought
to be explored.  An appeal to common sense, though rhetori-
cally powerful, is open to abuse, particularly where justice and
the majority view diverge.  While seizing upon certain quali-
ties of a particular idea by means of a carefully crafted
metaphor can shape future thinking, it can equally constrain
the fluidity and creativeness of jurisprudential thought.   
As such, the argument advanced in this paper is not a nor-
mative claim as to the desirability of metaphors in judicial
opinion.  Rather, it is an investigation into and reflection of the
rhetorical nature of the judgment—a character in which
metaphor participates.  A judgment is not a declaration of
fact—it is an assertion of the just.  The metaphor is an instru-
ment used in the persuasive project of judicial decision mak-
ing, an undertaking to arbitrate disputes and interpret legal
principles while maintaining and asserting the legitimacy of
the law.
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